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Abstract
We build a cultural transmission model to consider an effective measure for 
mitigating population outflow from areas affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake. 
In an economy with firms and two heterogeneous agents (residents within earthquake 
stricken areas and around these areas), when the stable interior steady state exists in 
our system, first we analyze how subsidies to firms affect the steady state population 
share for residents in earthquake stricken areas. Depending on conditions, the policy 
may either succeed (an increase in the population share compared to the case with 
no policy) or fail (a decrease in the share). Second, even if the subsidy policy fails, 
resident-led reconstruction efforts could potentially increase the steady state population 
share for residents when subsidy is simultaneously given. From the analysis, we find 
that resident-led reconstruction efforts can be an effective measure to mitigate the 
population outflow in earthquake stricken areas.
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1   Introduction
The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 had a tremendous impact on the 
economy of Japan. Among the various problems caused by the earthquake, in this 
paper we will focus on population outflow from earthquake stricken areas.1  Population 
outflow from the earthquake stricken areas leads to a decrease in number of persons 
engaged in recovery in the affected areas. Accordingly, it can be argued that population 
outflow itself is an important issue in the recovery. The progress of such an undesirable 
situation motivates us to address the following question: what is an effective measure 
to mitigate population outflow.
For considering this issue, it will be useful to examine some precedents such as the 
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995. At that time, reconstruction efforts in which 
the government took the initiative played an important role. In the context of the issue 
of population outflow, subsequent studies clarify that reconstruction efforts led by the 
government as a measure to mitigate the population outflow have limitations (Iwasaki 
et al. (1999), Tanaka and Shiozaki (2008), and Harada (2012)).2
According to Kohsaka (2012), this is partly because resident participation in 
reconstruction efforts is neglected.  She also points out that ignoring the interests of 
the residents would result in losing the stable order of a local community at that time. 
Based on the facts, she stresses on the relevance of reconstruction efforts in which the 
residents took the initiative (we call it resident-led reconstruction).3  It is necessary 
that residents make an effort to find a solution themselves by sharing roles with local 
governments.
Even though the relevance of resident-led reconstruction has been widely 
emphasized in the case studies above, it is theoretically not clear how resident-led 
reconstruction efforts affect the population outflow. In the present paper, we analyze 
how resident-led reconstruction efforts affect population in earthquake stricken areas, 
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and clarify its relevance as an effective measure to mitigate population outflow.
To investigate the question, we develop a cultural transmission model with firms 
and two heterogeneous residents.  The model developed in this paper is in line with 
the cultural transmission model by Bisin and Verdier (2001). The cultural transmission 
model is developed in order to explain the endogenous evolution of individual types. 
Bisin and Verdier derive the population dynamics of two heterogeneous agents who 
have their own cultures, where the agents interact through time with each other.4 
Francois and Zabojnik (2005) introduce production into the cultural transmission model 
by Bisin and Verdier. They consider an economy comprising an entrepreneur and a 
contractor, assuming each population being unity. There are two types of contractors: 
trustworthy and opportunist.  Francois and Zabojnik consider modern production 
between an entrepreneur and a contractor, which succeeds only if the entrepreneur 
cooperates with trust. Trustworthiness in an economy is an important factor because it 
is seen as a surrogate of social capital in an economy. They clarify an effective measure 
to increase the steady state population share for trustworthy in an economy.
We consider an economy comprising firms and residents. In addition, two types 
of heterogeneous agents (people within earthquake stricken areas and people around 
these areas) are introduced among the residents. Thus, our model has two types of 
actors comprising three units, as did Francois and Zabojnik (2005). Further, we employ 
population dynamics à la Francois and Zabojnik in order to capture a process of 
transition between two regions. There are two differences between our model and that 
of Francois and Zabojnik (2005). First, our formalization concerning firm’s investment 
before production differs.  While Francois and Zabojnik (2005) assume constant, we 
assume that it is a function of a share of firms. Based on the assumption, resident-led 
reconstruction can be introduced in our model. Second, our formulation regarding the 
dynamic equation with respect to shares of firm line differs. While it is increasing in 
Francois and Zabojnik’s model, it is mountain-shaped in ours. Our model analyzes an 
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aspect that Francois and Zabojnik’s model cannot focus on.
We explain the subsidies to firms in our model as follows. Setting a target level of 
firms’ share in earthquake stricken areas, the government provides subsidies to firms 
when a level of firms’ share exceeds the target level (see sections 3.1–3.2 for details). 
According to the degree of the government’s eagerness for reconstruction, the amounts 
of subsidy differ (i.e., more (less) the government’s eagerness, more (less) the amount 
of subsidy).  Next, we explain resident-led reconstruction efforts in our model.  Like 
the subsidy, setting a target level of firms, people in earthquake stricken areas cooperate 
with each other when the level of firms exceeds the target level (see equation (27)). 
Because of this cooperation, they can obtain profits, compared to a situation without 
cooperative behavior. According to the degree of their eagerness for cooperation, the 
amount of profits they obtain differs (i.e., more (less) the eagerness, more (less) the 
amount of profits). In particular, if the degree of residents’ eagerness for cooperation 
is suffciently larger than the government’s eagerness, we refer to such cooperative 
behavior as resident-led reconstruction.
In our analysis, when the stable interior steady state exists in our system, we 
analyze how the policy affects the steady state population share for residents in 
earthquake stricken areas. The following results are obtained by the analysis. First, 
depending on whether the steady state firms’ share is above or below the threshold of 
firms share, effects of subsidies on steady state share of residents in earthquake stricken 
areas largely differ. If the steady state firms’ share is above the threshold, subsidies to 
firms will lead to success in that there will be an increase in steady state population 
share for residents in the earthquake stricken areas (Subsection 4.2). On the other 
hand, if it is below the threshold, the policy will fail (Subsection 4.3). This implies that 
population share for residents in earthquake stricken areas will become zero in the long-
run. This suggests that only subsidies to firms, as a part of government-led policy, may 
have limitations to mitigate population outflow.  Second, we analyze how resident-led 
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reconstruction efforts, along with simultaneous subsidies, affect steady state population 
share for residents in earthquake stricken areas.  The following remarkable finding 
is observed: even if the subsidy policy fails (like in the case examined in Subsection 
4.3), resident-led reconstruction efforts can increase the steady state population share 
for residents in earthquake stricken areas (subsection 5.2). This finding suggests that 
resident-led reconstruction efforts, simultaneously with subsidies, can be an effective 
measure to mitigate population outflow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides our model. 
Section 3 clarifies the conditions under which the stable interior steady state exists. 
Section 4 analyzes the effect of subsidies on the steady state population share for 
residents in earthquake stricken areas. Section 5 analyzes the effect of resident-
led reconstruction efforts, simultaneously along with subsidies, on the steady state 
population share for residents in earthquake stricken areas. Section 6 concludes this 
paper.
2   The model
2.1   Production
We consider an economy with firms and two heterogeneous residents (people within 
earthquake stricken areas and people around these areas, hereafter also referred to as 
S-type and A-type, respectively). Firms decide on whether to engage in a cooperative 
production for reconstruction or not according to the profit maximizing principle. We 
assume that a firm cannot observe resident types, that is, S-type or A-type, in advance. 
For this reason, a firm that decides to engage in cooperative production meets every 
resident, and each time gives a random proposal on cooperative production to them. 
Only when a resident accepts the firm’s proposal, cooperative production will be 
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implemented. In the following analysis, we normalize both the total number of firms 
and the total number of residents as unity.
At time t, marginal profit that is generated from each cooperative production is 
denoted as π( pt), where pt∈ [0, 1] is the share of firms that are involved in cooperative 
production at time t.5   We assume that a function π(•) is continuous, π(0) is finite 
valued, and π′ ( p) <  0, π′′ (p) <  0.  The condition π′ ( p) < 0 is assumed in order to 
capture a decrease in marginal profits generated from cooperative production as the 
number of firms increase.
Marginal profits from cooperative production π( p) is distributed between a firm and 
a resident according to the following: the firm’s share and the resident’s share are απ( p) 
and (1 − α)π( p), respectively, where α is a parameter in (0, 1).
2.2   Firm
Let βt ∈ [0, 1] be the share of S-type at time t. In the case where a firm meets S-type 
with probability β, as a result of cooperative production, a firm obtains a share of 
marginal profits απ( p). Let k( p) be a marginal amount of investment by a firm in 
earthquake stricken areas before cooperative production can occur.  We assume that 
k′ ( p) < 0, k′′ ( p) < 0.  The condition k′ ( p) < 0 is assumed in order to capture the 
expectation that efforts by a firm before production become smaller as firms increase 
(scale effects). Thus, a firm obtains a net marginal profit from cooperative production 
απ( p) − k( p) with probability β. In the case where a firm meets A-type with probability 
1−β, the firm does not expect realization of cooperative production with the resident 
since there is no need of support for reconstruction. In this case, instead of engaging 
in cooperative production, a firm would do other activities such as sightseeing, which 
costs marginally b.  That is, a firm bears a marginal expense b with probability 1−β. 
From these, a firm’s expected net marginal profit is given by E[ p, β] := αβπ( p) − [βk( p) 
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+ (1−β)b]. We assume that a decision to enter or exit by a firm depends on the sign of 
E[•]. The number of firms increases in case where E[•] is positive, and vice versa. When 
the sign of E[•] is zero,
αβπ( p) − [βk( p) + (1−β)b] = 0, (1)
nobody enters or exits. By arranging equation (1) with respect to β, we obtain
(2)
 
Equation (2) is line p・ = 0 in the ( p, β) space, which is employed in the following 
analysis.
Now, we assume the following in order to facilitate our analysis:
Assumption 1.
απ( p) − k( p) > 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
Assumption 1 implies that a net marginal profit from each cooperative production is 
always positive. From Assumption 1, the right hand side of equation (2) is always in (0, 
1). In the following analysis, we assume that p is a jump variable, that is, for a given β, 
p satisfying equation (2) is immediately determined.
2.3   Two types of residents
First, we formalize the utility function for S-type. In earthquake stricken areas, they 
need active support for reconstruction. Accordingly, S-type would accept a proposal 
from a firm for cooperative production. As a result of cooperative production, they 
receive a share of marginal profits (1 − α)π( p). They also obtain a non-pecuniary reward 
γ > 0 through cooperative production, where γ represents the non-pecuniary fulfillment 
nobody enters or exits. By arranging equation (1) with respect to β, we obtain
β =
b
απ(p) − k(p) + b = 1 −
απ(p) − k(p)
απ(p) − k(p) + b . (2)
Equation (2) is line p˙ = 0 in the (p, β) space, which is employed in the following analysis.
Now, we assume the following in order to facilitate our analysis:
Assumption 1.
απ(p) − k(p) > 0,∀p ∈ [0, 1]. (3)
Assumption 1 implies that a net marginal profit from each cooperative production is always positive. From
Assumption 1, the right hand side of equation (2) is always in (0, 1). In the following analysis, we assume
that p is a jump variable, that is, for a given β, p satisfying equation (2) is immediately determined.
2.3 Two types of residents
First, we formalize the utility function for S-type. In earthquake stricken areas, they need active support for
reconstruction. Accordingly, S-type would accept a proposal from a firm for cooperative production. As a
result of cooperative production, they receive a share of marginal profits (1−α)π(p). They also obtain a non-
pecuniary reward γ > 0 th ough cooperative production, wh re γ represents the non-pecuniary fulfillment
involved in active engagement in reconstruction of their hometown. In addition, they obtain k(p), which is a
marginal profit obtained other than the production itself. Lastly, it costs F > 0 to remain in the earthquake
stricken areas. From these, we assume the utility function for S-type as follows:
uS (p) = x
[
(1 − α)π(p) + γ + k(p)] − F, (4)
where x is a characteristic function whose value is unity in the case of cooperative production, otherwise
zero. The expected utility for S-type is given by
u¯S (p) = p
[
(1 − α)π(p) + γ + k(p)] − F. (5)
Next, we formalize the utility function for A-type. People around the aﬀected areas can normally lead
their daily lives because the damages are not so serious compared with the situation in the earthquake stricken
6
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involved in active engagement in reconstruction of their hometown. In addition, they 
obtain k( p), which is a marginal profit obtained other than the production itself. Lastly, 
it costs F > 0 to remain in the earthquake stricken areas. From these, we assume the 
utility function for S-type as follows:
uS ( p) = x [(1 − α)π( p) + γ + k( p)] − F, (4)
where x is a characteristic function whose value is unity in the case of cooperative 
production, otherwise zero. The expected utility for S-type is given by
u¯S ( p) = p [(1 − α)π( p) + γ + k( p)] − F. (5)
Next, we formalize the utility function for A-type. People around the affected 
areas can normally lead their daily lives because the damages are not so serious 
compared with the situation in the earthquake stricken areas. Their decision to engage 
in cooperative production for reconstruction is based on their utility maximizing 
behaviors. Their decision is based on the corresponding utilities for each action, 
where these utilities are assumed to be evaluated solely based on their pecuniary 
considerations.  If the utility associated with cooperative production is higher than the 
other activity, they will engage in cooperative production, and vice versa. From these, 
we assume the utility function for A-type as follows:
uA ( p) = x max {(1 − α)π( p), b} , (6)
where from A-type’s points of view b can be seen as marginal gains obtained from an 
economic activity other than participation in cooperative production. The expected 
utility for A-type is given by:
u¯A ( p) = p max {(1 − α)π( p), b} . (7)
We assume that the following relationship holds:
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(1 − α)π( p) < b. (8)
Equation (8) implies that the share of marginal profits from cooperative production in 
earthquake stricken areas is always lower than marginal gains from economic activities 
in relatively less-damaged areas. Equation (8) implies that A-type does not always 
participate in cooperative production. Thus, the expected utility is pb from equation (7).
2.4   Population dynamics
In this subsection, we formalize the dynamics of population share for residents in the 
earthquake stricken areas.  Let d S  denote the probability that a person in an earthquake 
stricken area remains there.  Thus, a probability that he moves to another area is given 
by 1 − d S. We can interpret d S and 1 − d S as probabilities that he himself decides to 
either stay or migrate, respectively. Then, the probability that a person stays in an 
earthquake stricken area against his will is given by (1−d S )βt . Let P
SS
t  be a transition 
probability that a person in an earthquake stricken area at time t remains there at 
the next time. Then, we obtain PSSt = d
S + (1 − d S )βt . On the other hand, let P
SA
t  be a 
transition probability that a person in an earthquake stricken area at time t moves to 
other area at the next time. Then, we obtain PSAt = (1 − d
S )(1 − βt ). Likewise, P
AA
t  and P
AS
t 
can be obtained. Then, we obtain the following:
PSSt = d
S + (1 − d S )βt , (9)
PSAt = (1 − d
S )(1 − βt ), (10)
PASt = (1 − d
A )βt , (11)
PAAt = d
A +(1 − d A )(1 − βt ), (12)
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The population share in earthquake stricken areas at time t + 1 is given by
βt+1 = βt P
SS
 + (1 − βt )P
AS
. (13)
By substituting equations (9) and (11) into equation (13), we obtain
βt+1 − βt = βt (1 − βt )(d 
S − d A ). (14)
In the following analysis, in place of equation (14), we will employ the following 
differential equation.
β
・
  = β(1 − β)(d S  − d A). (15)
According to the right-hand side of equation (15), the population dynamics of residents 
in earthquake stricken areas depend on the sign of the difference d S − d A. Following 
Francois and Zabojnik (2005), we assume that the difference d S − d A is an endogenous 
variable, which depends on the difference of excess utilities for each type.
The excess utilities for S-type and A-type are given by
∆S := u¯St  − u¯At = pt [(1 − α)π( pt ) + k( pt ) + γ − b] − F, (16)
∆A := u¯At  − u¯St   = pt [b − (1 − α)π( pt ) − k( pt )] + F, (17)
respectively. Note that u¯At in equation (16) would be evaluated from the perspective of 
S-type if he or she were put in the A-type position. Likewise, note that u¯St in equation 
(17) would be evaluated from the perspective of A-type if he or she were put in the 
S-type position. The difference in both equations (16) and (17) is just a non-pecuniary 
fulfillment γ. Equation (16) has a γ due to evaluation of the S-type. On the contrary, γ is 
not contained in equation (17) because of evaluation of the A-type.
It is reasonable to say that the probability that a person continues to remain in an 
earthquake stricken area will rise if the utility associated with staying in the affected 
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areas is higher than the utility associated with moving to another area. Accordingly, 
let us assume that d S is an increasing function of the difference of excess utilities ∆S. 
Likewise, we also assume that d A is an increasing function of ∆A. Therefore, d S− d A 
depends on ∆S − ∆A .  Without loss of generality, the difference of the excess utilities 
for each type can be represented as pt [(1 − α)π( pt ) + k( pt ) + γ − b] − F. From this, d 
S 
− d A can be given as
dS − dA = Φ ( p [(1 − α)π( p) + γ + k( p) − b] − F) , (18)
where Φ : R → [−1, 1] is a continuous map satisfying Φ(0) = 0，Φ′ (•) > 0. By 
substituting equation (18) into equation (15), we obtain
β
・
 = β(1 − β)Φ ( p [(1 − α)π( p) + γ + k( p) − b] − F) . (19)
3   Steady states
3.1   The β
・
 = 0 line
In this section, we clarify characteristics of the steady state equilibrium given by 
differential equations (2) and (19). First, from equation (19), we have β
・
 = 0 for the 
relation ϕ ( p) = 0, 6 where
ϕ ( p) := p[(1 − α)π( p) + γ + k( p) − b] − F. (20)
In order to identify p satisfying ϕ ( p) = 0, we analyze the shape of the function ϕ . The 
first derivative of ϕ with respect to p is given by 7
ϕ ′( p) = (1 − α)π( p) + k( p) + γ − b + p [(1 − α)π′( p) + k′ ( p)] . (21)
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The sign of ϕ ′( p) is undetermined for any p ∈  (0, 1) because the first three terms in 
the right hand side of equation (21) are positive and the last three negative. Now, we 
assume the following condition:
Assumption 2.
(1 − α)π(1) − k(1) < b − γ < (1 − α)π(0) − k(0). (22)
Assumption 2 is the necessary condition for the interior steady state to exist. Under this 
assumption, we find the steady state in our model.
Equation (21) leads to the relation ϕ ′(0) > 0 > ϕ ′(1) from Assumption 2. The 
second derivative of ϕ with respect to p is given by
ϕ ′′( p) = 2 [(1 − α)π′( p) + k′( p)] + p [(1 − α)π′′( p) + k′′( p)] . (23)
Since π′ , π′′ , k′ , k′′ < 0, ϕ ′′ ( p) is negative.  From these, for a suffciently small 
number ε > 0, ϕ ( p) is increasing for p ∈  (0, ε) and ϕ ( p) is decreasing for p ∈  (1 − ε, 
1). Accordingly, a function ϕ is mountain-shaped.
Since a function ϕ does not depend on β (see equation (20)), line β
・
 =  0 consists 
of two vertical lines parallel to the β axis. Figure 1 shows the lines β
・
 = 0 in the first 
quadrant of the ( p, β) space, where one passes the point pA and the other pB.
0
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3.2   The p・ = 0 line
Second, the shape of line p・ = 0 (see equation (2)) depends on the shape of a net 
marginal profit from cooperative production απ ( p) − k ( p). For simplicity, we assume 
the following condition:
Assumption 3.
There exists a pˆ = arg min p∈ (0,1) απ( p) − k( p) satisfying the following:
If 0 < p < pˆ (resp. pˆ < p < 1), then απ′( p) − k′( p) < 0 (resp. απ′( p) − k′( p) > 0). (24)
Under Assumption 3, the shape of απ( p) − k( p) is single-deeped, and accordingly the 
shape of the p・ = 0 line is single-peaked.
Figure 2 shows the line p・ = 0 in the first quadrant of the ( p, β) space. 
As shown by the phase diagrams below (Figures 3, 4, and 5), the number of the 
stable steady states differs based on whether pˆ is more or less than pA .
 
0
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3.3   Case (I): pˆ ≥ pA
First, we consider the case where pˆ ≥ pA . In this case, as we see below, the stable 
steady states are the interior solution ( pA , βA ) and the origin (0, 0). Moreover, we 
classify the case into two subcases (i.e., β(1) ≥ βB and β(1) < βB). The reason for this 
classification is that depending on the presence of β(1) above or below βB, the set of 
initial values in the ( p, β) space convergent to the ( pA , βA ) differs.
3.3.1   Subcase (I)-(i): β(1) ≥ βB
Figure 3 shows the phase diagram in the case where β(1) ≥ βB.
Recall that the adjustments of firms are conducted instantaneously since p is a jump 
variable, whereas the adjustments of the residents change gradually. In other words, 
adjustment in the horizontal direction is immediate, and subsequently, adjustment in 
a β is conducted along the p・ = 0 line. Then, we find that ( pA , βA ) and (0,0) are stable. 
Any initial value such that β > βB will lead to convergence on ( pA , βA ). Conversely, 
any initial value such that β < βB will lead to convergence on (0,0). The shaded area 
0
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in Figure 3 is the set of the initial values convergent to ( pA , βA ). Note that ( pB, βB) is 
unstable.
3.3.2   Subcase (I)-(ii): β(1) < βB
Figure 4 shows the phase diagram in the case where β(1) < βB. 
The stable steady states are ( pA, βA ) and (0,0). Unlike the previous case, the set of 
initial values convergent to the ( pA, βA ) are limited to the shaded area in Figure 4.
3.4   Case (II): pˆ < pA
Figure 5 shows the phase diagram in the case where pˆ < pA. In this case, the stable 
steady state is just the origin (0, 0). Any point in the ( p, β) space converges to (0, 0).
0
45
－46 （　）－
4   Subsidy
4.1   Subsidies to firms
We consider subsidy to firms as a reconstruction effort adopted by the government 
in order to hinder a decrease in marginal profit of residents accompanied by an increase 
in firms. Specifically, setting a target level of firms’ share in the earthquake stricken 
areas, the government provides subsidies to firms when a level of firms’ share exceeds 
the target level. A marginal profit function for cooperative production in which the 
policy is incorporated is given by
(25)
A p˜ ∈ [0, 1] represents the target level, which can be interpreted as the timing of the 
government’s intervention. A τ1 ∈ (0, 1] represents a proxy parameter of how actively 
4 Subsidy
4.1 Subsidies to firms
We consider subsidy to firms as a reconstruction eﬀort adopted by the government in order to hinder a
decrease in marginal profit of residents accompanied by an increase in firms. Specifically, setting a target
level of firms’ share in the earthquake stricken areas, the government provides subsidies to firms when a level
of firms’ share exceeds the target level. A marginal profit function for cooperative production in which the
policy is incorporated is given by 
π(p) if p < p˜,
τ1π(p˜) + (1 − τ1)π(p) if p ≥ p˜.
(25)
A p˜ ∈ [0, 1] represents the target level, which can be interpreted as the timing of the government’s inter-
vention. A τ1 ∈ (0, 1] represents a proxy parameter of how actively the government provides firms with
subsidies, which can be interpreted as the degree of the government’s eagerness for reconstruction eﬀorts.
In the case where the stable interior steady state exists before the policy, which is denoted as (pA0 , β
A
0 ),
we analyze how the policy aﬀects the steady state population share for S-type. To begin with, we define a
function ϕ associated with the case of τ0 (i.e., no subsidy) as ϕ0. In the following, we consider the case where
p˜ < pA0 , which means that the policy is conducted at a relatively early stage compared to the share of firms in
earthquake stricken areas in a steady state associated with no subsidy. 8 ϕ and ϕ0 are represented in Figure 6.
［Insert Figure 6]
For p > p˜, the diﬀerence between ϕ(p) and ϕ0(p) is given by
ψ(p) := ϕ(p) − ϕ0(p) = p [(1 − α)τ1(π(p˜) − π(p)) + k(p)] . (26)
Since π is a decreasing function of p, π(p˜) − π(p) is positive, and accordingly, ψ(p) > 0. Thus, the relation
pA0 < p
A holds.
From this, we obtain the following.
Proposition 1. If p˜ < pA0 , then line β˙ = 0 moves rightward after the policy intervention.
12
0
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the government provides firms with subsidies, which can be interpreted as the degree of 
the government’s eagerness for reconstruction efforts.
In the case where the stable interior steady state exists before the policy, which 
is denoted as ( pA0 , β
A
0 ), we analyze how the policy affects the steady state population 
share for S-type. To begin with, we define a function ϕ associated with the case of τ0 (i.e., 
no subsidy) as ϕ0 . In the following, we consider the case where p˜ < pA0 , which means 
that the policy is conducted at a relatively early stage compared to the share of firms 
in earthquake stricken areas in a steady state associated with no subsidy. 8 ϕ and ϕ0 are 
represented in Figure 6.
For p > p˜, the difference between ϕ ( p) and ϕ 0 ( p) is given by
ψ( p) := ϕ ( p)  − ϕ 0 ( p) = p [(1 − α)τ1 (π( p˜) − π( p)) + k( p)] . (26)
Since π is a decreasing function of p, π( p˜) − π( p) is positive, and accordingly, ψ( p) > 0. 
Thus, the relation  pA0 < p
A holds.
From this, we obtain the following.
Proposition 1. If p˜ < pA0 , then line β
・
 = 0 moves rightward after the policy intervention.
Figure 7 shows a shift in line β
・
 = 0 in this case.
0
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Note that the p・ = 0 line simultaneously shifts with a shift in β
・
 = 0. Moreover, the p・ 
= 0 line defined over p ≥ p˜ shifts downward. Thus, a variation in β corresponding to the 
steady state, which is realized after the policy intervention, depends on the effects of 
the relative positions between lines β
・
 = 0 and p・ = 0.
4.2   Success
We consider the case where pA ≤ pˆ. In the case, βA0 < β
A holds. 
0
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4.3   Failure
Conversely, we consider the case where pA > pˆ. In subcase (I)-(i), if we take an initial 
value arbitrarily in the shaded area in Figure 3, a cycle occurs. In subcase (I)-(ii), an 
arbitrary initial value in the shaded area in Figure 4 converges to (0, 0).
0
0
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5   Resident-led reconstruction
5.1   Resident-led reconstruction
As we saw in the previous section, subsidy to a firm, which is a policy led by the 
government, can succeed by causing an increase in β (Subsection 4.2). On the other 
hand, it can fail as well (Subsection 4.3). This suggests that sole reliance on the subsidy 
policy may have limitations in mitigating population outflow. Under what conditions 
could such a consequence be avoided?
In this section, we analyze how what we call resident-led reconstruction efforts 
affect the steady state population share for S-type when subsidies are simultaneously 
given to firms. Recall that k( p) is a marginal amount of investment by a firm in the 
earthquake stricken areas before cooperative production. In other words, it can be 
viewed as a marginal profit for S-type.  Since the residents’ marginal profits decrease as 
firms increase, by the assumption that k( p) is a decreasing function of p, S-type would 
0
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have an incentive to undertake measures to hinder a decrease in their marginal profits.
Under these circumstances, each S-type would share mutual interests. Therefore, 
we consider cooperative behavior for S-type. Likewise, in case of the subsidy policy 
(Subsection 4.1), setting a target level of firms, S-type are unified when the level of 
firms exceeds the target level. A marginal profit function for the residents in which such 
behaviors for S-type are incorporated is given by
(27)
where τ2 ∈  (0, 1] is a proxy parameter, which refers to the degree of eagerness of S-types 
for cooperation. In the following, to facilitate our analysis, we assume that the timing 
for residents’ cooperative behaviors is equal to the government’s intervention timing p˜.
By substituting equations (25) and (27) in equation (2), we obtain the following:
(28)
We define resident-led reconstruction efforts based on the relative magnitudes of 
two parameters τ1 , τ2 as follows.
Definition 1   If τ1, τ2  satisfy the condition
     
(29)
then we call this situation “a resident-led reconstruction.”
If τ2 is suffciently larger than τ1 , in other words, the degree of residents’ eagerness 
for cooperative behavior is suffciently higher than government’s eagerness for 
reconstruction efforts, then reconstruction efforts are resident-led. From Assumption 
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k(p) if p < p˜,
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where τ2 ∈ (0, 1] is a proxy parameter, which refers to the degree of eagerness of S-types for cooperation.
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β =

b
απ(p)−k(p)+b if p ≤ p˜,
b
απ(p)−k(p)+b+ατ1[π˜−π(p)]−τ2k(p) if p > p˜.
(28)
We define resident-led reconstruction eﬀorts based on the relative magnitudes of two parameters τ1, τ2 as
follows.
Definition 1 If τ1, τ2 satisfy the condition
τ2
τ1
> α · max
p∈[ p˜,1]
[
π˜ − π(p)
k(p)
]
, (29)
then we call this situation “a resident-led reconstruction.”
If τ2 is suﬃciently larger than τ1, in other words, the degree of residents’ eagerness for cooperative
behavior is suﬃciently higher than government’s eagerness for reconstruction eﬀorts, then reconstruction
eﬀorts are resident-led. From Assumption 1 and equation (29), for p > p˜, the line p˙ = 0, associated with
post-government intervention, is always located above the one associated with pre-government intervention.
From this, we obtain the following proposition.
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1 and equation (29), for p > p˜, the line p・ = 0, associated with post-government 
intervention, is always located above the one associated with pre-government 
intervention. From this, we obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 2  If reconstruction efforts are resident-led, policy measures cause line p・ = 
0 to shift upward. 
5.2   Success
We again consider the case of subsection 4.3 (i.e., pˆ < pA ). As shown in Figure 12, if 
the relation pA < ˆ pˆ holds under resident-led reconstruction efforts, ( pA, βA*) is the stable 
steady state.  Any initial value in the shaded area in Figure 12 will lead to ( pA, βA*). 
This suggests that resident-led efforts can cause an increase in the population share for 
S-type (i.e., β0 < β
A*) even if the subsidy policy fails.
0
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6   Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a cultural transmission model with firms and two 
heterogeneous agents. By analyzing how resident-led reconstruction efforts, combined 
with subsidy, affect the resident population in earthquake stricken areas, we clarify its 
relevance as an effective measure to mitigate population outflow.
The results from the analysis in sections 4 and 5 are summarized in Table 1. 
0
Sec.5Sec.4
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The symbol “↑” means that the steady state population share for S-type, which is 
realized after the policy becomes larger compared to the share before the policy.  The 
asterisk symbol “＊” means that any initial value in the ( p, β) space is convergent to 
(0,0), or occurs as a cycle. In this sense, the symbols “↑” and “＊” correspond to the 
cases of success and failure, respectively. In section 4, when the subsidy policy leads to 
the relation pA < pˆ, any initial value in the shaded area (Fig. 8) is convergent to
 ( pA, βA ) (> ( pA0 , β
A
0 )). In section 5, resident-led reconstruction efforts combined with 
the subsidy lead to the relation pA < ˆ pˆ, and any initial value in the shaded area (Fig. 
12) is convergent to ( pA, βA*). Note that βA* > βA . From our analysis, resident-led 
reconstruction efforts can enhance the effects of subsidies to firms on the population 
outflow. Thus, it can be said that our findings theoretically support the relevance of 
resident-led reconstruction efforts.
Finally, we note the following two points.  First, resident-led reconstruction effort 
by itself has limited effects on population outflow compared to the effects of a mixed 
policy (i.e., the combination of resident-led reconstruction effort and subsidies). Thus, 
resident-led reconstruction efforts also require collaboration with government-led 
policies in order to become effective measures to alleviate the population outflow. The 
second point is concerning our definition of resident-led reconstruction efforts. In our 
model, based on the relative magnitudes of the two parameters τ1 , τ2 , it is formalized 
briefly. We consider that our definition can be made more elaborate by examining 
various case studies regarding resident-led reconstruction efforts. This aspect will be 
taken up by us in future research.
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Notes
1   If we look at statistics (Reconstruction Agency, 2012), the first three prefectures in the order of largest 
number of residents evacuated are Miyagi, Fukushima, and Iwate; the fourth is Yamagata, which is a 
neighboring prefecture that did not have any earthquake stricken areas. This enables us to observe that 
most people move to a relatively less-damaged area within the prefecture they live in, or some people 
evacuate to a neighboring prefecture such as Yamagata.
2   Harada (2012) points out the case of Nagata ward, Kobe as an example of government-led 
reconstruction efforts.  Although new buildings were built, redevelopment of areas resulted in a 
decrease in population in the Nagata ward.―Iwasaki et al. (1999) and Tanaka and Shiozaki (2008) 
conducted follow-up investigations regarding subsequent population movements in Takatori-east 
district and Osuga- west district, both belonging to Nagata-ward, respectively. According to their 
studies, the percentage of people who returned to their original residential areas to those who migrated 
after the earthquake is no more than 20%–30%.
3   See also Niisato and Hashimoto (2014).
4   Since Bisin and Verdier (2001), a line of research has developed. The methodology has been applied 
to closely related issues. Important theoretical contributions have been made by Hauk and Saez-Marti 
(2002), Tabellini (2008), Guiso et al. (2008), Bisin et al. (2009), Calabuig and Olcina (2009), Bidner 
and Francois (2010), and Hayashi et al. (2011). Bisin and Verdier (2010) provide a comprehensive 
survey of the theoretical and empirical literature.
5   In the following, we omit a subscript t unless necessary.
6   We also have β
・
 =  0 for β =  0, 1.  However, we will exclude the cases in the following because these 
are inconsistent with the observed facts.
7   Strictly speaking, a function ϕ( p) has a kink at p = p˜. Thus, ϕ( p) is not differentiable at p = p˜. 
However, it does not substantially affect the following analysis.
8   We can also consider the case where p˜ is larger than pA0. In this case, the policy intervention is 
ineffective because the steady state associated with the post-government intervention is the same as 
the one corresponding to pre-government intervention. Specifically, ϕ0 ( p) is given below p-axis in 
Figure 3. Accordingly, pA0 has no change, and hence, β
・
 = 0 has no movements.
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